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Mutation Testing for Integer Overflow in Ethereum Smart Contracts
Jinlei Sun, Song Huang , Changyou Zheng , Tingyong Wang, Cheng Zong, and Zhanwei Hui
Abstract: Integer overflow is a common vulnerability in Ethereum Smart Contracts (ESCs) and often causes huge
economic losses. Smart contracts cannot be changed once it is deployed on the blockchain and thus demand
further testing. Mutation testing is a fault-based testing method that can effectively improve the sufficiency of a test
for smart contracts. However, existing methods cannot efficiently perform mutation testing specifically for integer
overflow in ESCs. Therefore, by analyzing integer overflow in ESCs, we propose five special mutation operators to
address such vulnerability in terms of detecting sufficiency in ESC testing. An empirical study on 40 open-source
ESCs is conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed mutation operators. Results show that (1) our
proposed mutation operators can reproduce all 179 integer overflow vulnerabilities in 40 smart contracts, and the
generated mutants have high compilation pass rate and integer overflow vulnerability generation rate; moreover,
(2) the generated mutants can find the shortcomings of existing testing methods for integer overflow vulnerability,
thereby providing effective support to improve the sufficiency of the test.
Key words: blockchain; Ethereum Smart Contracts (ESCs); integer overflow; mutation testing
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Introduction

Blockchains are decentralized shared ledgers that
combine data blocks into a specific data structure
chronologically and use cryptographic methods to ensure
that data cannot be tampered with or forged. The first
appearance of blockchains was in Bitcoin proposed by
Nakamoto[1] . In recent years, the concept of blockchains
has become increasingly popular. At the same time,
Ethereum[2] has become more widely used in various
fields, such as “Blockchain 2.0”.
Ethereum is a blockchain that provides Turingcomplete programming language, such as Solidity[3] .
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Programmers can create smart contracts on Ethereum.
An Ethereum Smart Contract (ESC) is a program
deployed on the Ethereum blockchain, which contains
predefined states, transition rules, execution conditions,
and execution logic. When the execution conditions are
met, the execution logic is automatically implemented.
Smart contracts expand the ability of the blockchain to
process data. Numerous smart contracts are deployed
on Ethereum, thus requiring higher requirements for
security. According to the study of Nikolic[4] , 3686
of 3759 smart contracts have an 89% probability of
containing a security vulnerability. Many serious smart
contract security incidents have occurred in the real
world. For example, the well-known Dao[5] security
vulnerability in June 2016 resulted in a loss of 50 million
dollars. In July 2017, the Parity[6] multisignature
wallet’s two security vulnerabilities resulted in losses
of 30 million dollars and 152 million dollars. In April
2018, the BEC[7] token was stolen, and its market value
of 900 million dollars almost dropped to zero due to
integer overflow. Considering that ESCs may involve a
large amount of funds, a vulnerability in a tiny line of
code may also cause huge losses.
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Integer overflow is a common vulnerability in
ESCs. Kalra et al.[8] showed that 1095 of 1564 smart
contracts contain integer overflow vulnerabilities. This
phenomenon occurs because of two reasons. On the one
hand, the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) only has
256-bit integers, whereas Solidity has many types of
integers (8-bit and 16-bit integers). Therefore, integers
from Solidity to EVM types are not strictly mapped. On
the other hand, Solidity and EVM are not strict enough
to deal with integer overflow faults. When an integer
overflow occurs, the program does not actively throw
an exception but continues to execute subsequent code.
Therefore, testing for integer overflow faults in smart
contracts is particularly important.
At present, research on integer overflow vulnerability
testing mostly focuses on how to detect the
vulnerabilities in smart contracts[8] ; however, research
on evaluating smart contract testing technology remains
imperfect. On the one hand, most ESCs exist in the form
of bytecodes; thus, the number of smart contract source
codes that can be used for testing and evaluation in
reality is limited. On the other hand, manually labeling
integer vulnerabilities in the existing smart contract is
laborious. Nevertheless, mutation testing can effectively
alleviate the above two situations. Some researchers[9]
have also proposed the use of mutation testing to
evaluate test techniques and test cases. However, no
perfect indication exists for integer overflow mutation
operators. On this basis, this study analyzes integer
overflow vulnerabilities in the most widely used Solidity
smart contract in Ethereum and proposes five mutation
operators. First, we summarize the three types of
integer overflow bugs that exist in smart contracts:
arithmetic, truncation, and signed overflow. Second,
five special mutation operators are proposed for the
above three types of integer faults. These operators
include mutation operators that have already existed
in traditional mutation tests and those proposed in this
study.
An empirical study was conducted on 40 open-source
ESCs. The results show that (1) our proposed mutation
operators can reproduce all 179 integer overflow
vulnerabilities in the original 40 smart contracts, and the
generated mutants have high compilation pass rate and
integer overflow vulnerability generation rate; moreover,
(2) the mutants generated by the mutation operators can
find the shortcomings of existing testing methods for
integer overflow vulnerability, thus providing effective
support to improve the sufficiency of the test.
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The main contributions of this study are as follows:
 We analyze the integer overflow vulnerabilities
existing in smart contracts and propose five special
mutation operators for integer overflow in ESCs.
 Based on the proposed mutation operators, we
implement an integer overflow mutation tool so
that mutation injection for integer overflow can be
automatically performed.
 We collect and label 40 open-source smart contracts
with integer overflow vulnerabilities, generate 2099
mutants, and conduct an empirical study on them. The
results show that our operators can not only generate
useful mutants but also provide effective support for
improving the sufficiency of ESC testing. The above
tool and data are available at GitHub[10] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 provides basic information on ESCs and
mutation testing and describes the main integer overflow
vulnerabilities in ESCs. Section 3 provides the related
work, and Section 4 describes our mutation operators
in ESCs mutation testing. Section 5 presents the design
and analysis of the empirical study conducted. Section
6 provides threats to validity. Section 7 concludes the
study and presents plans for future work.

2
2.1

Background
Ethereum smart contracts

Smart contracts, which were proposed by Szabo[11]
in 1996, encapsulate predefined states and transition
rules and trigger contract execution scenarios and
response operations in specific scenarios. When
execution conditions are satisfied, smart contracts are
automatically executed, and the execution result is
generated in accordance with the code in the contract.
Blockchains are suitable for smart contracts due to
its decentralization, immutability, and traceability.
Currently, many blockchain systems (such as Bitcoin[1]
and Ethereum[2] ) support smart contract technology.
With a complete programming language and a series
of complex construction tools, Ethereum has become
an attractive blockchain platform for building various
decentralized applications.
The Ethereum blockchain has two types of accounts:
external and contract. External accounts are created
by individuals and controlled by a secret key, whereas
contract accounts are created when a contract is deployed
and mainly controlled by the contract code. External and
contract accounts can implement operations, such as
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transfer of Ether and contract invocation, by sending
transactions according to the contract address.
At present, the most popular smart contract
programming language in Ethereum is Solidity; thus,
the research object of this study is ESCs written using
Solidity. Solidity is a Turing-complete language similar
to JavaScript. Programmers use Solidity to write smart
contracts and compile them into EVM bytecodes; then,
they deploy smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain
by sending transactions.
Smart contract security vulnerabilities frequently
occur due to several reasons. First, the programming
language of smart contracts (e.g., Solidity) is relatively
new and thus may have some shortcomings. Second,
programmers are not familiar with Solidity languages,
and some errors are difficult to avoid when writing smart
contract codes. Third, smart contracts cannot be changed
once deployed on the blockchain. Even if vulnerabilities
are found in the contract, the contract cannot be repaired
by patching.
2.2

Mutation testing

Mutation testing is a fault-based software testing
technique[12] . Two assumptions are held in mutation
testing: the competent programmer[13] and coupling
effect[14] hypotheses. The former means that the
programmer encodes as well as possible, and the
encoding product is close to correct. It means that
the vulnerabilities in the code are subtle and thus
mutation testing can simulate coding vulnerabilities by
changing a small part of the code. The latter assumes
that complex vulnerabilities are superimposed by simple
vulnerabilities, and complex vulnerabilities can be found
by detecting simple vulnerabilities; that is, having only
a single vulnerability in the mutants is meaningful. The
workflow of mutation testing for smart contracts is
shown in Fig. 1.
Mutation testing can measure the quality of test cases
or test techniques, such as fuzz test[15] , and has been

widely used in traditional software testing research[16] .
ESCs are often vulnerable and difficult to modify after
deployment. Therefore, further testing is required before
ESCs are deployed on the chain. Moreover, mutation
testing can be an effective technique in promoting the
quality of ESC testing.
2.3

Integer overflow vulnerability in ESCs

Kalra et al.[8] pointed out that the integer overflow is one
of the most frequent vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The results of their study showed that 1095 of the 1564
smart contracts contain integer overflow vulnerabilities.
The famous BEC, SMT, and FNT smart contract security
events are caused by integer overflow vulnerabilities.
Integer overflow in Solidity is similar to traditional
integer overflow[17] , which can be divided into three
categories: arithmetic, truncation, and signed overflow.
2.3.1

Arithmetic overflow

Arithmetic overflow is the most common type of
integer overflow vulnerability. It is mainly caused by
the absence of boundary checking when performing
arithmetic operations, which can be divided into
overflow and underflow.
Overflow occurs when the assignment of an integer
variable is beyond its upper limit. For example, in the
SWC-101 overflow code segment shown in Fig. 2, the
variable balance is a 256-bit unsigned integer. When the
input value deposit is large and the sum of the balance is
greater than 2256 , it causes the balance to overflow and
become a relatively small value.
When the assignment of an integer variable exceeds
the lower limit of its representation range, underflow
occurs. The main arithmetic operator that causes
underflow is subtraction. For example, in the SWC101 underflow code segment shown in Fig. 3, count is
1
2
3
4
5
6

contract Simple Add f
uint public balance = 10 000 000;
function add(uint256 deposit) public f
balance += deposit; // Overflow
g
g
Fig. 2

1
2
3
4
5
6
Fig. 1

Workflow of mutation testing.
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SWC-101 overflow code segment.

contract Simple Min f
uint public count = 1;
function min(uint256 input) public f
count -= input; // Underflow
g
g
Fig. 3

SWC-101 underflow code segment.
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a 256-bit unsigned integer. When the input value input
is greater than count, it causes count to underflow and
become a relatively large value.
2.3.2

Truncation overflow

Integers in Solidity range from 8 to 256 bits and increase
in increments of 8 bits. Assigning an integer with a
small bit-width to an integer with a large width does not
cause overflow; by contrast, assigning an integer with
a large bit-width to an integer with a small bit-width
results in truncation and a smaller value. For example,
in the following code snippet in Fig. 4, truncation
overflow occurs when msg.value, which was originally
uint256, is truncated to uint64 in Line 3, resulting
in balance[msg.sender] having a much smaller than
msg.value.
2.3.3

Signed overflow

Signed overflow is caused by the difference between
the target variable type and the assigned value type,
including two cases. One is the conversion of signed
integers to unsigned integers. The highest bit of a
signed integer is the sign bit. If a signed number is
assigned to an unsigned integer of the same size, it
overflows to a larger positive number. Another one is
overflow when converting unsigned integers to signed
integers. If a larger unsigned integer is assigned to a
signed integer of the same length, it may be converted
to a negative number and cause a fault. In the following
code snippet in Fig. 5, the input parameter value of
function trasferFrom is of type int, which is converted
to uint in subsequent use, and may cause balances[ to]
to add a larger value and cause a security hole.

3

Related Work

3.1

Mutation testing

Mutation testing was first proposed by DeMillo et al.[13]
in 1978. After continuous development[18–20] , it has had
1
2
3
4

mapping(address=>uint64) balance;

balance[msg.sender] = uint64(msg.value)

Fig. 4

1
2
3
4

Example of truncation overflow.

function tranferFrom(address to, int value)

balance[to]=balance[to].add(uint(value))

Fig. 5

Example of signed overflow.

a history of more than 40 years. Mutation testing is used
in different types of software testing, such as Java[21] ,
C#[22] , and C++[23] in object-oriented languages[24–26] ;
Haskel[27] in functional programming languages[28] ; and
mobile[29, 30] and web application testing[31, 32] .
Wu et al.[9] introduced mutation testing to smart
contract testing for the first time. Fifteen new mutation
operators were designed for ESCs, and the mutation
testing tool, MuSC[33] , was implemented. Hartel
and Schumi[34] performed mutation testing on an
online gaming contract and proposed a standard
Mothra mutation operator and four mutation operators
specifically for Solidity. The results show that the special
mutation operators are more efficient than the standard.
In Reference [35], 10 types of mutation operators
were proposed for ESCs, and these operators were
implemented on the basis of the UniversalMutator.
3.2

Smart contract testing

Oyente[36] is one of the earliest smart contract analysis
tools. It performs a symbolic execution of smart contracts
at the bytecode level. Based on Oyente, Osiris[37]
conducted research on integer overflow vulnerabilities in
smart contracts and used symbolic execution technology
to detect three types of integer overflow. Maian[4] can
find self-destruct and drain ESCs from any address and
detect ESCs without payment function.
Some researches have analyzed smart contracts from
the perspective of formal verification. Bhargavan et
al.[38] used functional language F* to analyze SMT
and proposed analysis tools for source and byte codes.
Hirai[39] used Isabelle/HOL Proof Assistant to model
Ethereum semantically and verified a specific smart
contract named Deed. ZEUS[8] can quickly verify
security contracts through technologies, such as abstract
interpretation, symbol model checking, and constrained
horn clauses.
In addition, many scholars have examined the security
of smart contracts from the perspective of static
analysis. Securify[40] uses a Souffle Datalog solver
to analyze the EVM bytecode statically and infer
precise semantic information related to the contract.
SmartCheck[41] converts the source code into an XMLbased intermediate representation form and uses the
XPath mode to check. SolidityCheck[42] formats the
code, filters the keywords, and then uses regular
expressions to detect vulnerabilities in the filtered
code or insert codes to prevent the occurrence of
vulnerabilities.
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Slither[43] is a static analysis framework that
converts a reliable smart contract into an intermediate
representation called SlithIR; it applies program analysis
techniques, such as data flow and pollution tracking, to
extract and refine information. Durieux et al.[44] screened
the existing smart contract analysis tools and run nine
tools on 69 smart contracts with 115 vulnerabilities.
The results showed that the total detection rate of smart
contract vulnerability detection of the above tools is 42%
with some space for improvement.
In terms of dynamic testing, Jiang et al.[45] proposed
ContractFuzzer, the first security vulnerability fuzzy
testing framework for Ethereum smart contracts. It
generates test input that conforms to the calling
contract’s call syntax, defines new test predictions,
and uses EVM monitors smart contract execution
information to detect vulnerabilities. ContraMaster[46]
is a smart contract dynamic testing framework based on
new test oracle. It guides the fuzzing process through
data flow, control flow, and contract status analysis. And
it can judge the results in accordance with the invariance
between the recorded and actual amount in the smart
contract. ReGuard[47] develops a fuzzy-based analyzer to
detect reentry vulnerabilities automatically. In particular,
it performs fuzzing on smart contracts by iteratively
generating random but different transactions.

4

Ethereum Smart Contract
Overflow Mutation Operators

Integer

In this section, we propose a series of mutation operators
for arithmetic, truncation, and signed overflow in
Solidity smart contracts.
4.1

Arithmetic overflow mutation operator

Using the SafeMath library or adding check conditions
during arithmetic operations can prevent the occurrence
of arithmetic overflow. However, these methods are
insufficient due to the following reasons. First, the
SafeMath library is not introduced in all smart contracts.
Torres et al.[37] analyzed 495 token smart contracts on
Ethereum and found that 32% of them did not use the
SafeMath library. Second, although some smart contracts
use the SafeMath library, coders may also use arithmetic
operators directly instead of SafeMath functions due
to negligence, as the example described in CVE-201810299[48] . Third, incorrect check sentences may also
cause this fault.
Based on the above analysis, we propose three types
of mutation operators for arithmetic operations. These
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three types of operators correspond to the missing or
unused SafeMath library, the wrong check statements,
and the missing check statements, respectively.
4.1.1

SafeMath Operation Replacement (SOR)

The SafeMath library has rewritten the arithmetic
operators such as C; ; ; =; and % and added a
check during the operation to prevent integer overflow.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the SafeMath
library introduced in the smart contract has no integer
vulnerabilities, and operations using library functions in
the smart contract will not cause integer overflow.
However, programmers may not use the functions in
the SafeMath library correctly during programming. For
example, although the SafeMath library is introduced,
arithmetic operators may be directly used in the
operation. The SOR operator simulates this; it turns
the SafeMath function in the smart contract into an
arithmetic operator, and its specific representation and
description are shown in Table 1.
Figure 6 shows an example of an SOR operator
mutating the contract StandardToken, which defines
the SafeMath library to prevent integer overflow
failure. SORsub replaces the operation performed by the
library function SafeMath.sub() used in Line 17 with
the arithmetic operator “ ” as shown in Line 20. If the
input value is greater than balances[msg.sender], then
an underflow vulnerability may occur in Line 20; thus,
balances[msg.sender] is assigned with a large value.
4.1.2

Condition Statement Deletion (CSD)

In addition to using the SafeMath library, programmers
can also prevent arithmetic overflow by setting condition
checking. These condition statements in Solidity are
usually in three forms: the require(), assert(), and if
statements.
Previous studies[9, 35] have proposed mutation
operators that delete require() and assert() statements.
However, not all the absence of require() and assert()
statements will cause arithmetic overflow. The solution
proposed in this study is to match through regular
expressions and find require() and assert() statements
that prevent arithmetic overflow.
Table 1 SafeMath operation replacement operators.
Operator
Description
SORadd
Replace SafeMath.add() with “+”
SORsub
Replace SafeMath.sub() with “ ”
SORmul
Replace SafeMath.mul() with “”
SORdiv
Replace SafeMath.div() with “=”
SORmod
Replace SafeMath.mod() with “%”

Tsinghua Science and Technology, February 2022, 27(1): 27–40
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

library SafeMath f
function sub(uint256 a, uint256 b) returns
uint256 f
require (a > b);
uint256 c D a bI
return cI
g

g

contract StandardToken f
mapping(address =>uint256) balances;
function transfer(address to, int value)
public returns(bool)f
require( to != address(0));
//Change ”SafeMath.sub()” to ”–”
//balances[msg.sender] = SafeMath.sub(
//balances[msg.sender], value)
balances[msg.sender]=
balances[msg.sender]–value;
balances[to]=SafeMath.add(balances[to],value);
Transfer(msg.sender, to, value);
return true;
g
g

Fig. 6

SOR mutation for StandardToken.

Arithmetic overflow usually occurs during arithmetic
operations, and the condition statement to prevent
arithmetic overflow must contain the operands in
the arithmetic expression. We first match the basic
binary arithmetic operators (C; ; ; =; %) and shortcut assignment operators (C D; D;  D; % D; = D),
and then the parameters that appear in the matching
arithmetic expression are checked again. If the same
parameters appear in the condition statements, such
as require(), in the same function, then the condition
statement is considered an overflow prevention condition
statement for the above formula.
The mutation operators CSDa , CSDr , and CSDi
delete the assert(), require(), and if statements matched
by the regular expression. The name and description of
the mutation operator are shown in Table 2.
The example in Fig. 7 shows the process of mutating
Table 2
Operator
CSDa
CSDr
CSDi

CSD operators.
Description
Delete assert() sentence
Delete require() sentence
Delete if sentence

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

contract Overflow Add f
uint public balance = 10000000;
function add(uint256 deposit) public f
//require(balance<balance+deposit)
balance CD deposit; // Overflow
g
g
Fig. 7

CSD mutation for Overflow Add.

the Overflow Add contract by the CSDr operator. After
matching the require() statement on Line 4 through
regular expression, CSDr deletes it. Integer overflow
may occur in Line 5 during the “C D” operation.
4.1.3

Condition Statement Change (CSC)

An incorrect setting of conditions may also lead to
arithmetic overflow. Therefore, a mutation operator for
modifying the condition sentence must be designed.
Previous studies[9, 35] have also proposed operators
that mutate relational operators >, >, <, 6, etc.
However, not all wrong use of relational operators lead
to integer overflow. Only when the relational operator in
the condition sentence that prevents integer overflow is
used incorrectly can integer overflow occur. Therefore,
similar to the CSD, we first use the regular expression
for the CSC to match the relational operators in the
condition sentence that prevents integer overflow in the
code and then perform the inverse operation. The name
and description are shown in Table 3.
An example of CSC operator is shown in Fig. 8. The
“<” in Line 3 is changed to “>” in Line 4, thereby
causing an integer underflow vulnerability in Line 5.
4.2

Truncation overflow mutation operator

The Solidity language supports multiple integer types
from 8 to 256 bits, with a variable step size of 8, and
Table 3
Operator
CSCa
CSCr
CSCi
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

CSC operators.
Description
Change assert() sentence
Change require() sentence
Change if sentence

contract Simple Sub f
function sub(uint256 a, uint256 b) internalf
//require(b<a);
require(b>a);//change the relation operators
return a b; // Underflow
g
g
Fig. 8

CSC mutation for Simple Sub.
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supports address types. The truncation overflow in the
Solidity smart contract is usually caused by converting
the bit-width integer to a bit-narrow integer.
Simply converting a bit-width type identifier directly
into a bit-narrow type may not directly cause truncation
overflow. Therefore, we design the Variable Type
Change (VTC) operator to convert the originally defined
bit-width type into a bit-narrow type when used. The
operator is shown in Table 4.
An example of a VTC operator is shown in Fig. 9.
The variable “deposit” is originally of type uint, that is,
the integer type of uint256. When it is calculated in the
function add(), it is converted to uint64. If deposit is
relatively a large value, truncation overflow may occur.
4.3

Signed overflow mutation operator

The integer types in Solidity language are divided into
signed integer type int and unsigned integer type uint.
If the value that has been assigned to signed integer
type int is converted to unsigned integer type uint again,
then signed overflow occurs, and vice versa. Similar to
truncation overflow, directly changing the type definition
in the code does not cause signed overflow at all. Hence,
we need to convert the value originally defined as the
signed integer int to the unsigned integer uint, and vice
versa. The key is to have type changes.
Therefore, we design two mutation operators for
signed overflow. The operator SUR converts the signed
integer int to the unsigned integer uint, and the USR
converts the unsigned integer uint to the signed integer
int. The operators’ names and descriptions are shown in
Table 5.
An example of an SUR operator is shown in
Table 4 Truncation overflow mutation operator.
Operator
Description
VTC
Variable type change
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

contract Tru Add f
uint public balance = 1;
function add(uint256 deposit) public f
require(balance < balance + deposit);
balance = uint64(deposit) + (balance);
g
g
Fig. 9
Table 5
Operator
SUR
USR

VTC mutation for Tru Add.

Signed overflow mutation operators.
Description
Signed to unsigned replacement
Unsigned to signed replacement
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Fig. 10. The input parameter amount of the function
withdrawOnce() is of type int, and Line 6 of the code
converts it to type uint when it is used. Then, signed
overflow occurs. It may cause the transfer() function to
send additional ethers to msg.sender.
4.4

Summary of the operators

The five mutation operators in this study are different
from those of previous studies[9, 33, 34] . These operators
can accurately simulate various integer overflow faults.
Among the operators in this study, the SOR is proposed
for the first time to simulate arithmetic overflow faults
caused by the improper use of the SafeMath function in
ESCs. Although operators, such as CSD, CSC, VTC, and
SUR/USR, are also used in traditional mutation testing,
we have made improvements to enable it to be used
exclusively in ESC mutation testing. CSD and CSC use
regular expressions to find conditional statements, which
are used to prevent integer overflow vulnerabilities,
and then perform deletion and modification to simulate
arithmetic overflow faults; VTC and SUR/USR operators
find the definition of a variable and then modify its size
and sign to simulate truncation and signed overflow.
These differences of the proposed mutation operators
are described in Table 6.

5

Empirical Study

In this section, we conduct an empirical study to evaluate
the integer overflow mutation operators proposed
1
2
3
4
5
6
6
7

function withdrawOnce (int amount) public f
if (amount>1 ether jj transferred[msg.sender])f
revert();
g
//Change the int “amount” to uint
msg.sender.transfer(uint(amount));
transferred[msg.sender]=true;
g
Fig. 10

Table 6
Operator
SOR
CSD

SUR mutation for withdrawOnce.

Difference of proposed mutation operators.
Description
First proposed in this work.
Delete the condition sentences that are used to
prevent integer overflow in ESCs.
CSC
Change the condition sentences that are used to
prevent integer overflow in ESCs.
VTC
Change the size of a variable when it is used after
it is defined in ESCs.
SUR/USR Change the sign of a variable when it is used after
it is defined in ESCs.
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above. In the following, the research questions are first
raised. Then, the experimental data and experimental
process are described. Finally, the experimental results
are presented and analyzed.
5.1

Research questions

The goal of this section is to answer the following
research questions:
 RQ1: Can mutation operators effectively
mutate ESCs? In the process of ESC testing, the
number of source codes of smart contracts with defects
is limited. One of our goals is to be able to mutate
smart contracts through the operators proposed in this
study and simulate all types of integer overflow bugs in
ESCs.
 RQ2: Can the mutants generated by the
proposed operators effectively evaluate test cases or
test tools? Mutation testing can evaluate and promote
the performance of test cases or test tools by generating
mutants. The other goal of this study is to be able to
measure the performance of existing approaches or tools
in ESC integer overflow testing through the proposed
operators.
Table 7
Category

5.2

Experimental data

The experimental data can be divided into two parts.
The first part is a series of ESCs used to illustrate integer
overflow vulnerabilities. We select 10 of them from
the dataset SBCURATED in Ref. [14]. The location and
type of vulnerabilities in these contracts are known and
commonly used in the validity testing of ESC analysis
tools. The second part is ESCs already deployed on the
Ethereum blockchain. Reference [49] lists nine types
of integer overflow vulnerabilities in ERC20 Token. In
each category, several smart contracts are listed. The
first part of the dataset is the sample code used to display
the vulnerability; most of them are relatively short.
Therefore, we add the second part to strengthen the
authenticity of the experimental data and the credibility
of the experimental results. At the same time, we only
select up to five smart contracts from each category
(may be less than 5 in some categories) due to the
large similarity between the types of vulnerabilities and
contract codes in each category; we obtain 30 ERC20
Token smart contracts as the second set of data.
The selected ESCs’ details are shown in Table 7. We

Experimental data information.
Description

Trigger overflow bypass by entering larger parameters and
use the batchTransfer() function to achieve batch transfer.
Overflow occurs when adding and subtracting the totalSupply
totalsupply-overflow
of the total token amount, producing an unexpected value.
When performing transfers and other operations in the
verify-invalid-by-overflow contract, the balance will be verified, and the verification
can be bypassed to achieve illegal transfers through overflow.
The owner constructs a large exchange value so that the
sell-price-for-overflow
overflow of the ether to be converted is calculated, and the
“high price and low sale” are realized.
The owner transfers more tokens than the account balance
overweight-token-bywhen transferring to construct an underflow, realizing any
overflow
increase in the account.
decrease-balance-byOwner controls the account balance by adding numerous
tokens to the account to achieve overflow.
overflow
When the owner allocates tokens to the account, he can
excess-allocation-bybypass the upper limit by overflowing, thereby assigning
overflow
more tokens to the specified address.
The owner creates an overflow by passing in a large value,
excess-mint-token-bybypassing the setting of the maximum value of coins in the
overflow
contract, to issue any number of coins.
Users buy a large enough number of tokens to create an
excess-buy-token-byoverflow, thereby bypassing the upper limit of the coin
overflow
issuance and obtain more tokens.
example-of-overflow
Smart contracts that illustrate integer overflow vulnerabilities.
Total
batchTransfer-overflow

Number Number of ESC
of
integer overflow
ESCs
vulnerabilities

Number of
ESC code
lines

5

10

1330

4

33

978

2

2

604

2

10

432

5

11

517

5

24

1126

1

14

341

3

9

778

3

42

992

10
40

24
179

353
7451

Jinlei Sun et al.: Mutation Testing for Integer Overflow in Ethereum Smart Contracts

manually check for integer overflow vulnerabilities in
the contract and mark them; then, we fix these integer
overflow vulnerabilities to obtain the repaired version of
each ESC.
5.3

Experiment 1: Effectiveness of mutation
operators in generating mutants

In this experiment, we use the valid rate of the generated
mutants by our operators, the number of mutants that
contain integer overflow vulnerabilities, and the number
of original vulnerabilities that can be reproduced to
evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed mutation
operators.
5.3.1 Experimental setup
The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the
effectiveness of our operators in generating mutants. To
this end, we first manually check for integer overflow
vulnerabilities in the original contract and mark them.
Then, we fix the detected vulnerabilities to obtain the
repaired version of each smart contract. Finally, we
mutate the repaired smart contract. This evaluation is
mainly conducted from the following three aspects:
The first is to count the number of mutants that can be
compiled. The Solidity code written by the programmer
can finally be compiled. If the generated mutant cannot
pass the Solidity compiler, even if it contains an integer
overflow vulnerability, it is of no use in the mutation test.
To this end, we use the Solidity compiler to obtain the
number of mutants that can be compiled.
The second is to check the number of mutants that
contain integer overflow. The purpose of this study is to
investigate mutation testing for integer overflow in ESCs.
Therefore, we need the operators to generate mutants
with integer overflow vulnerabilities. If a mutant does
not contain any integer overflow vulnerabilities, then it
has no effect on evaluating the test case. To this end, we
Table 8
Category
batchTransfer-overflow
totalsupply-overflow
verify-invalid-by-overflow
sell-price-for-overflow
overweight-token-by-overflow
decrease-balance-by-overflow
excess-allocation-by-overflow
excess-mint-token-by-overflow
excess-buy-token-by-overflow
example-of-overflow
Total
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manually review and count the number of the generated
mutants with integer overflow vulnerabilities.
The third is to investigate whether the mutants can
achieve the simulation of programmers who are prone
to make mistakes in the coding process. The mutant
is closer to the real vulnerability, and the test case can
be evaluated further. To this end, we analyze whether
the generated mutants cover different types of integer
overflow vulnerabilities in ESCs. Then, we count the
number of the vulnerabilities in original ESCs that can
be reproduced.
5.3.2

Results of Experiment 1

The results of the generated mutants from 40 ESCs by
the proposed mutation operators are shown in Table 8. In
this manner, all the mutants chosen for this experiment
are nonequivalent mutants.
As shown in Table 8, a total of 2099 integer overflow
mutants are generated for 40 smart contracts. The
number of mutants generated by the CSC and CSD
operators is equal. This result is obtained because
CSC and CSD operators are mutated for the condition
statement corresponding to the arithmetic operation.
The difference is that the CSC operator changes the
sentence, and the CSD operator directly deletes the
sentence. The number of mutants generated by the
SOR operator is relatively small (only 89) because the
number of generated mutants by SOR for some ESCs
is 0. Further analysis reveals that the ESCs in some
categories do not use the SafeMath function library, and
the SOR operator is a mutation operator for the SafeMath
library function. The number of mutants generated by
the VTC and SUR/USR are relatively large (732 and
676, respectively) because these two mutation operators
mutate for the variables with integer type, which is often
used in ESCs.

Mutant number of five operators for 10 categories of ESCs.
CSC
CSD
SOR
VTC
25
25
34
65
62
62
0
118
4
4
0
54
25
25
0
63
12
12
0
53
73
73
48
150
12
12
0
26
18
18
7
51
54
54
0
126
16
16
0
26
301
301
89
732

SUR/USR
63
112
47
58
53
148
25
49
99
22
676

Total
212
354
109
171
130
492
75
143
333
80
2099
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For the first aspect, we observe whether the mutant
can be complied. The mutants that can be compiled are
called Valid; otherwise, it is called Invalid. The number
and proportion of Valid and Invalid mutants are shown in
line 2 of Table 9. In Table 9, the first line is the number
of the generated mutants, the second line is the number
of valid mutants that can be complied by the Solidity
complier, and the third line is the number of mutants that
contain integer overflow vulnerability.
As shown in Line 2 of Table 9, 1393 of all 2099
mutants (approximately 66%) are Valid. From the
perspective of different mutation operators, all the
mutants generated by the CSC, CSD and SOR operators
are Valid, with a ratio of 100%. Most of the mutants
generated by VTC (695 in 732) are Valid, with a ratio of
approximately 95%. By analyzing the Invalid mutants,
we find that the input parameters before the SafeMath
library function, such as “.add()”, cannot compile
after the mutation. Because the contract states that the
SafeMath library is only used for uint256 type integers,
and VTC converts the uint256 integer to uint128 integer,
and then the compilation error occurs when using the
SafeMath function. Most of the mutants generated by
SUR/USR are Invalid. Only 7 of the 676 mutants are
Valid. Through analysis, we find that the SUR/USR
operator changes the type of an integer when the integer
variable is used after definition. Most of the variables
are used to participate in arithmetic or passed into the
function as parameters. On the one hand, when variables
with different symbols are present in the arithmetic,
passing the Solidity compiler is impossible. On the
other hand, if the type of the input does not match the
function, then the code cannot be compiled, resulting in
many Invalid mutants. Moreover, the mutated function
with flexible types of input arguments causes the seven
mutants to be successfully compiled. This result also
shows that the mutation operator of the signed overflow
for the Solidity smart contract is almost Invalid. If we
remove the mutants generated by the SUR/USR operator,
we can conclude that the Valid rate of the mutants is 97%
(1386 in 1423). The above results show that the mutation
operator mentioned in this study can effectively generate
Valid mutants.
For the second aspect, we count whether the Valid
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mutant contains integer overflow. The number of Valid
mutants that contain integer overflow vulnerability is
shown in Line 3 of Table 9.
Among the 1393 Valid mutants, 1323 (95%)
contain integer overflow vulnerabilities. We have fixed
the integer overflow vulnerabilities in the original
contract; thus, these integer overflow vulnerabilities are
considered to be generated by the mutation operators.
Most of the generated mutants (297 in 301) by the CSC
and CSD operators contain at least one integer overflow
vulnerability. By analyzing the mutants without integer
overflow vulnerabilities, we find that implementing
the match process for the condition statement is not
sufficiently accurate, resulting in four mutants that
cannot trigger integer overflow. This problem occurs
in the implementation of the code rather than a mutation
operator. The number of mutants that do not contain
integer overflow vulnerabilities (62) is much greater
than the number of mutants with integer overflow
vulnerabilities (27) in the mutants produced by the
SOR operator. This phenomenon is mainly caused
by two reasons. On the one hand, some Safemath
functions’ inputs are constants. Changing the function
to ordinary operators can not cause integer overflow
vulnerability. On the other hand, if a condition statement
to prevent integer overflow is also contained, then
mutating the Safemath function does not cause an integer
overflow vulnerability. VTC and SUR/USR change the
variable type, which certainly causes truncation or signed
overflow vulnerability. The above analysis reveals that
the mutation operators mentioned in this study can
effectively generate integer fault mutants.
For the third aspect, we count the number and
percentage of reproductive vulnerabilities.
The 179 integer overflow vulnerabilities in the
original smart contracts are all reproduced. By analyzing
the results, we find that the proposed operators
can reproduce integer vulnerabilities in the original
smart contract, which also shows that the proposed
operators can effectively simulate the integer overflow
vulnerability in ESCs. In addition, the CSC operator
causes some logical failures and changes the original
execution path of the program. Therefore, compared
with CSC, the CSD operator is suitable for generating

Table 9 Number of mutants that can be complied and that contain integer overflow vulnerabilities.
Category
CSC
CSD
SOR
VTC
SUR/USR
Mutants
301
301
89
732
676
Valid mutants
301
301
89
695
7
Mutants with integer overflow
297
297
27
695
7

Total
2099
1393
1323
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pure integer vulnerability mutants.
To conduct a comparative experiment with existing
tools, this study selects the method proposed by
Andesta et al.[35] . This method designs 10 types of
mutation operators for different types of smart contract
vulnerabilities, including integer overflow. We use the
tool implemented on the basis of the universal mutator
of this study to execute the integer overflow mutation
on the 40 selected ESCs. The results show that 2022
of all 5422 mutants can be compiled, with a percentage
of 40.6%. Through further analysis, we find that the
truncation and signed overflow operators in this tool
perform mutation when the variable appears, but our
operators perform mutation when the variable is used.
In addition, the method in Ref. [35] does not change the
condition statement according to the operation statement
but directly changes all the conditions to “True” or
“False”, and thus does not cause an integer overflow
failure but a logic failure. In addition, the Safemath
function is not mutated in Ref. [35]. Therefore, the
method proposed in this study is more efficient than the
method in Andesta et al.[35] in terms of integer overflow
vulnerabilities’ mutation. The advantage of Ref. [35]
is that it proposes a series of mutation operators for
multiple smart contracts; such proposal is one of our
future work.
Answer to RQ1: Can mutation operators
effectively mutate ESCs? The mutation operator
proposed in this study can generate 2099 mutants from
40 ESCs, of which 1393 are valid mutants that can be
compiled. Of the invalid mutants, 669 are from the
USR/SUR mutation operator. The main reason is that
the Solidity compiler automatically checks variables
with different symbols. If this part is removed, then the
number of valid mutants accounts for 97% of the total
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(1386 in 1423). Meanwhile, 95% (1323 in 1393) of the
valid mutants contain integer overflow vulnerabilities,
and the 179 integer overflow vulnerabilities in the
original ESCs are all reproduced by mutation operators.
Through comparative analysis, the method proposed
in this study is superior to the existing methods in
integer overflow mutation. Therefore, the mutation
operator proposed in this study is considered to be able
to (a) generate all the three types of integer overflow
vulnerabilities effectively and (b) reproduce different
integer overflow vulnerabilities in real-world ESCs.
5.4

Experiment 2: Effectiveness of mutation
operators in mutation testing

In this experiment, we use the mutants generated by
five mutation operators to evaluate an integer overflow
vulnerability detection tool named Osiris[37] , find its
shortcomings, and improve its effectiveness.
5.4.1

Experimental setup

The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the
effectiveness of the mutants in evaluating test cases or
test tools by calculating the mutation scores of the testing
tools during testing.
The test tool chosen in this experiment is Osiris[37] ,
an open-source ESC integer overflow vulnerability
detection tool based on symbolic execution technology
with a low false positive rate.
The experimental steps are as follows: First, we
use Osiris to test the mutants generated from 40 smart
contracts and then obtain the test results and mutation
scores. Finally, we analyze the tool Osiris in accordance
with the test results.
5.4.2

Results of Experiment 2

The results are shown in Table 10. We list the number

Table 10 Result of running Osiris on the mutants. “T” represents the number of the compliable mutants, “K” represents the
number of mutants killed by Osiris, and “S” represents the number of surviving mutants.
CSC
CSD
SOR
VTC
SUR/USR
Category
T
K
S
T
K
S
T
K S
T
K
S
T K S
25
12
13
25
16
9
18 12 6
62
1
61
0 0 0
batchTransfer-overflow
61
27
34
61
29
32
0
0
0
112
2
110
2 0 2
totalsupply-overflow
4
0
4
4
0
4
0
0
0
54
0
54
5 0 5
verify-invalid-by-overflow
25
20
5
25
22
3
0
0
0
61
2
59
0 0 0
sell-price-for-overflow
12
8
4
12
9
3
0
0
0
53
0
53
0 0 0
overweight-token-by-overflow
73
51
22
73
52
21
3
2
1
141
2
139
0 0 0
decrease-balance-by-overflow
12
4
8
12
0
12
0
0
0
26
0
26
0 0 0
excess-allocation-by-overflow
18
14
4
18
16
2
6
6
0
49
1
48
0 0 0
excess-mint-token-by-overflow
51
6
45
51
0
51
0
0
0
111
3
108
0 0 0
excess-buy-token-by-overflow
16
4
12
16
14
2
0
0
0
26
0
26
0 0 0
example-of-overflow
297 146 151
297 158 139
27 20 7
695 11 684
7 0 7
Total
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of mutants generated, killed, and survived by the CSC,
CSD, SOR, VTC, and SUR/USR operators in Table 10.
The mutation scores are then calculated.
To demonstrate the capability of Osiris to detect
integer overflow vulnerability intuitively, we plot the
mutation scores of Osiris among various mutants in
Fig. 11.
Osiris has the highest mutation score among the
mutants generated by the SOR mutation operator,
reaching 74.1 (kill 20 of the 27 mutants). The surviving
mutants are mainly with a mutation in the “for” loop
block, indicating that Osiris has difficulty detecting such
integer overflow vulnerabilities. Osiris obtains a low
score on mutants generated by VTC and SUR/USR
(1.6 and 0), indicating that Osiris can hardly detect the
truncation and signed overflow in ESCs.
The mutation scores of Osiris in the CSC and CSD
mutants are 49.2 and 53.2, which are approximately
half of the mutants killed. The survived CSC and CSD
mutants that can be divided into three categories. The
first is that the mutated sentence in the mutants is
a postconditional sentence. The second is that some
arithmetic operations involve numbers. The third is that
the results of the arithmetic are not used. The first two
categories are deficiencies in the detection capabilities
of Osiris. In the third category, the arithmetic results
that are not used may overflow but will not cause serious
consequences; such characteristic is an advantage of
Osiris.
Answer to RQ2: Can the mutants produced by
the mutation operators effectively evaluate test cases
or test tools? Through the mutants generated by the
mutation operator proposed in this study, the integer
overflow vulnerability detection tool Osiris is evaluated,
and the mutation scores of Osiris on CSC, CSD, SOR,
VTC, and SUR/USR are 49.2, 53.2, 74.1, 1.6, and 0,
respectively. By analyzing the surviving mutants, we
can obtain the advantages and disadvantages of Osiris.

Therefore, the mutation operators proposed in this study
can be considered effective in evaluating test tools for
integer overflow vulnerabilities and help improve its
adequacy.

6

Threat to Validity

One threat to the validity in our evaluation may
be that we mainly selected ERC20 Token smart
contracts to conduct our experiment and thus may
bring one-sidedness to the experimental results. To
alleviate this situation, we selected 30 open-source smart
contracts with nine different types of integer overflow
vulnerabilities. At the same time, some smart contracts,
which are used as examples for ESC integer overflow
vulnerability, are selected.
Another threat to the validity of our evaluation
may be that in Experiment 2, we only selected one
integer overflow vulnerability test tool, which may be
insufficient in reflecting the effectiveness of this method
in evaluating other test cases or test tools. We will try
more tools in our future work.

7

Conclusion and Future Work

Integer overflow is one of the most common vulnerability
in ESCs, and it causes many economic losses. Therefore,
finding the integer overflow vulnerability in ESCs
is important. Mutation testing is a technique for
evaluating test cases and improving test adequacy. This
study applies mutation testing to the integer overflow
vulnerability test in ESCs and proposes five mutation
operators specifically for integer overflow vulnerability.
The empirical study reveals that the mutation operators
in this study can generate integer overflow vulnerability
mutants and evaluate integer overflow vulnerability
test tools. In other words, our method is effective
in improving the quality of testing integer overflow
vulnerabilities in ESCs. In our future work, on the one
hand, we will study the shortcomings of the mutation
operators in this study and extend the application to
other test cases and test tool evaluation. On the other
hand, we will extend mutation testing to other types of
vulnerabilities.
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